For this reason statements like
All A-s are B, despite the way that beside
B such statements reference a third object - the world. Let’s examine the way thinking evolves from limited-scope to universal, using Immanuel Kant’s table of categories, that he laid down in his book “The Critique of Pure Reason” (and which are based on the main logical judgements).
Immanuel Kant split the pure concepts of the understanding into four classes called quantity, quality, relation and modality and notably each class contains 3 categories, instead of 2, the third member being, according to the author, a combination of the other two.
- Inherence and subsistence
- Causality and dependence
- Possibility - Impossibility
- Existence - Non-existence
- Necessity - Contingency
Here is what the author says about he third members of each category:
II. The number of the categories in each class is always the same, namely, three—a fact which also demands some consideration, because in all other cases division à priori through conceptions is necessarily dichotomy. It is to be added, that the third category in each triad always arises from the combination of the second with the first. Thus totality is nothing else but plurality contemplated as unity; limitation is merely reality conjoined with negation; community is the causality of a substance, reciprocally determining, and determined by other substances; and finally, necessity is nothing but existence, which is given through the possibility itself. Let it not be supposed, however, that the third category is merely a deduced, and not a primitive conception of the pure understanding. For the conjunction of the first and second, in order to produce the third conception, requires a particular function of the understanding, which is by no means identical with those which are exercised in the first and second. Thus, the conception of a number (which belongs to the category of totality) is not always possible, where the conceptions of multitude and unity exist (for example, in the representation of the infinite). Or, if I conjoin the conception of a cause with that of a substance, it does not follow that the conception of influence, that is, how one substance can be the cause of something in another substance, will be understood from that. Thus it is evident that a particular act of the understanding is here necessary; and so in the other instances.